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Recent Developments
nterpreting Maryland's statuteprohibi i  u authorized
access to computers, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, in Briggs v.
State, 348 Md. 470, 704 A.2d 904
(1998), held that a defendant's
conviction under that statute
cannot stand where the defendant
was actually authorized to use his
employer's computers. The
decisions suggests that it is left to
the General Assembly to
determine if such conduct should
be criminalized.
Terry Briggs ("Briggs") began
working for the Scarborough
Group, Inc. ("Scarborough") as a
computer specialist in November,
1994. He was responsible for the
management of the entire
computer system, with duties that
included data entry and the placing
of passwords on computer files.
Briggs resigned from his position
with Scarborough in July, 1995,
following a dispute over the terms
of his contract.
Soon thereafter, Scarborough
discovered that it could not access
some computer files because
Briggs was the only person who
knew the passwords. Unable to
settle the dispute with Briggs,
Scarborough sued Briggs and
reported the situation to the Anne
Arundel County Police
Department. Briggs was charged
under Article 27, §§ 342, 146(c)(2)
of the Annotated Code with theft of
computers and unauthorized
access to computers. (1996 &
Supp. 1997).
The crux of the State's
argument was that Briggs changed
the passwords, something he was
not entitled to do unless someone
else in the company was given the
changed passwords. Briggs
claimed that he could not
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remember the passwords due to
the length of time which had
elapsed since placing them on the
files in dispute. In a motion for
judgment of acquittal, Briggs
argued that section 146 did not
apply to his conduct, claiming that
the statute was not intended to
punish authorized users who
misuse their employer's
computers. The trial court denied
Briggs's motion and the jury
convicted him of unauthorized
access to computers. Briggs filed
an appeal and on its own motion,
the court of appeals granted
certiorari.
The court first noted that for
Briggs to be convicted under
article 27, section 146 (c)(2)(I), the
State must prove: "1) that Briggs
intentionally and wilfully accessed
a computer or computer system; 2)
that the access was without
authorization; and 3) that the
access was with the intent to
interrupt the operation of the
computer services." Briggs, 348
Md. at 476, 704 A.2d at 908. The
court then focused on the second
element of the offense, lack of
authorization, which it determined
to be dispositive. Id. at 476-77,
704 A.2d at 908.
The court first looked to the
plain meaning of the statute at
issue in order to ascertain
legislative intent. Id. At 476-77,
704 A.2d at 908, (citing Whack v.
State, 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d
1347, 1350 (1995)). Noting that
the word "authorization" was not
defined in the statute, the court
consulted dictionaries for a
generally accepted definition of
"authorize." The court found
phrases such as "to empower," "to
permit a thing to be done," "to give
a right or authority to act," and "to
clothe with authority or legal
power." Briggs, 348 Md. at 479-
80, 704 A.2d at 909.
With these definitions of
"authorize," the court concluded
the plain meaning of the statute
was to prohibit persons without
authorization from accessing
computer systems. Id. at 480-81,
704 A.2d at 910. The statute did
not speak of persons who go
beyond the scope of authority
granted to them, or misuse such
authority. Id. The court noted that
the evidence at Briggs's trial
established that he was authorized
to use the computer system to
enter data and place passwords on
files. Id. at 480, 704 A.2d at 909-
10. As such, he possessed the
authority that must in fact be
absent to support his conviction.
Id. at 480-81, 704 A.2d at 910.
The court of appeals also
analyzed the legislative history of
the statute. Id. at 481, 704 A.2d at
910. In 1984, House Bill 121 was
introduced to the Legislature as a
measure to criminalize "'illegal
access to computers."' Id. The
28.2 U. Bat LF.J. 19
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court examined testimony in
support of the bill and found that
its purpose was to deter "hacker"
activity, where the goal is to
penetrate the computer system.
Id. at 482, 704 A.2d at 910.
Specifically, it was discovered that
in the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee Report for House Bill
121, the legislature sought to
"deter individuals from breaking
into computer systems."' Id., 704
A.2d at 911. An amendment to the
statute added two subsections that
created two new substantive
crimes. Id. Here, the legislative
intent behind the amendment
appeared to be the imposition of
criminal liability on "hackers" for
the damage they cause to
computer systems after gaining
access without authorization. Id. at
483, 704 A.2d at 911. Again, the
Legislature appeared to be
concerned with "hackers" who
never had authorization to use the
computer systems.
Based on its interpretation of
Maryland's unauthorized access to
computers statute, supported by
plain meaning analysis and an
examination of legislative history,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed Briggs's conviction,
holding that a person can not be
convicted under the statute when
authority has been granted to that
person to use the computer
system. However, the argument
can be made that if one reads the
statute plainly, focusing on the
words that apply to the facts in
Briggs, the statute actually reads
that a person may not intentionally,
willfully, and without authorization
access a computer system to
cause the malfunction, or interrupt
the operation of a computer
network. With this reading of the
statute, one could argue that
Briggs did violate the statute, as
although he had authorization to
access the computer system, he
did not have authorization to do so
to interrupt the operation of the
system. In Briggs v. State, the
court of appeals made clear that to
criminalize acts done to a
computer system by a person
authorized to access the system,
the Legislature must act to include
users who exceed their authority.
28.2 U. Bait LF.J. 20
